

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Globalization and nationalism: Retrospect and prospect

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Abstract

Recent events have highlighted areas of conflict between economic integration with the outside world and the demands of domestic electorates. Historically, the tradeoffs have always become sharper in periods of crisis, such as the present. After reviewing the U-shaped progress of globalization since the nineteenth century, this essay reconsiders John Maynard Keynes's views on "national self-sufficiency" in the early 1930s. I argue that the postwar Bretton Woods system he helped to create evolved from those views as a balanced middle ground between market forces and governments' desires for domestic economic stability. The gradual erosion of that balance in favor of the market has helped produce discontent over globalization and more nationalism in politics. Enhanced multilateral cooperation in key areas offers the hope of supporting globalization while better meeting voters' aspirations. Despite daunting political obstacles to global cooperation these days, collective action challenges in areas such as climate, cybersecurity, and health—alongside economic policy—are becoming only more pressing over time.

KEYWORDS

deglobalization, globalization, multilateralism, nationalism, populism

JEL CLASSIFICATION

F52; F53; F60; N20; N40

1 | INTRODUCTION

Nationalism has been on the rise throughout the world—with peoples' national attachments often driven by ethnic, racial, religious, regional, or political identifications. The trend is evident in countries ranging from Myanmar, India, and China, to Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Nationalism's rise connects inseparably to globalization, if for no other reason than globalization's capacity to confront a country's residents with the outside world through trade, immigration, new technologies, and media. The current *zeitgeist*, however, endangers a postwar structure of international economic linkages and institutions whose architects were convinced both that nationalistic policies helped bring on global depression and war and that global economic cooperation could promote prosperity and peace.

The bidirectional connections between nationalism and globalization—with globalization arguably spurring a nationalistic domestic politics and nationalism threatening policy shifts that compromise global economic integration—justify a focus on *economic nationalism* (De Bolle & Zettelmeyer, 2019). In principle, economic policies aiming to further purely domestic objectives can be perfectly consistent with a high degree of global economic

Abbreviations: IMF, International Monetary Fund; TPA, Trade Promotion Authority; TPP, Trans-Pacific Partnership.

integration and cooperation. Thus, my key questions today will concern why this “divine coincidence” often seems difficult to achieve in practice, and why, when difficulties arise, global integration can be an early victim.

While my goal is to get beyond quotidian observations about the “winners and losers from trade,” however essential these are as a starting point, you will see that my reflections add up to much less than a full and rigorous account. Still, it seems useful at least to put the current disruptions in their historical context—one objective being to illustrate the continuity with past developments and thereby offer hope that public action has some scope to address the current malaise.

Tensions over international cooperation, notably in the area of cross-border economic integration, have spiked very recently owing to the pandemic and its severe economic dislocations. Figure 1 shows that rapid falls in international trade have accompanied economic crises, with the most recent collapse looking especially sharp, if International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections are accurate. Whether trade recovers as the IMF also forecasts will depend on current nationalistic responses to the crisis being transitory rather than becoming the new normal. Unfortunately, the buildup of nationalistic antagonisms leading up to the novel pathogen’s emergence does not offer a hopeful backdrop. Even more reason for policymakers to overcome past tensions, notwithstanding the national demands of the moment.

2 | TRACKING GLOBALIZATION’S RISE, FALL, AND RISE

A chart drawn from a recent survey by Catão and Obstfeld (2019) illustrates the vicissitudes of globalization over the last two centuries. Figure 2 shows the data we have on the growth of world trade since the early nineteenth century. While the nominal trade data shown in the figure (as a percent of nominal GDP) are not ideal, they do show how trade grew through the eve of World War I, consistent with historical accounts of the “first globalization.” Since the early 1970s trade has certainly grown beyond its earlier peak, especially with the strong growth in services trade more recently.

The level of world trade follows a U-shape, however, declining sharply after the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, and remaining depressed before starting on a noticeable recovery in the late 1950s. The U-shape of global economic integration characterizes other indicators, as noted by Obstfeld and Taylor (2004), and reflects a retreat from economic internationalism starting around the onset of World War I.

Figure 3 shows an indicator of financial integration, the ratio of countries’ gross foreign assets to GDP. The U pattern is again apparent, although since the late 1980s, increases in this de facto indicator of integration have led it to outstrip by far anything seen before World War I.



FIGURE 1 World trade and output growth in this millennium. *Source*: International Monetary Fund, WEO database, June 24, 2020. Global output growth is a weighted average, with output shares valued at market exchange rates. IMF projections for 2020 and 2021




FIGURE 2 Ratio of global exports to GDP (%). *Source* : See Catão and Obstfeld (2019)




FIGURE 3 Ratio of gross foreign assets to GDP (%). *Source* : See Catão and Obstfeld (2019)

A third aspect of international economic integration is the international movement of labor. As shown in Figure 4, during the first globalization from 1870 to 1914, the global stock of labor resident in a foreign country rose fivefold, before receding in the face of war and immigration restriction by the United States (for example, the US Emergency Quota Act of 1921) and other Anglo-Saxon countries of recent settlement. Resistance to immigration emerged even before World War I, in line with an emerging trade backlash in the period (O'Rourke, 2018; O'Rourke & Williamson, 1999). As Figure 5 shows, well before 1914, around the turn of the twentieth century, the White Australia policy was discouraging immigration there. Immigration recovered after World War II, however, with surges coming at different points in different advanced countries and a notable surge in global immigrant shares starting in the mid-1980s. The growth in advanced-economy immigrant presence in recent decades is, of course, an important driver of recent political developments.




FIGURE 4 Global immigrant population (percent of global population). *Source*: See Catão and Obstfeld (2019)




FIGURE 5 Immigrant population in selected countries (percent of country or region population). *Source*: See Catão and Obstfeld (2019)

3 | THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND KEYNES'S RESPONSES

While tensions regarding trade and immigration emerged well before the interwar period, the worldwide spread of the Great Depression resulted in a collapse of global trade and financial linkages, as chronicled by authors including Kindleberger (1973), James (2001), and Findlay and O'Rourke (2007). Against this backdrop, John Maynard Keynes (1936) published *The General Theory*, with its message that national governments have both the responsibility and the means to act in support of national employment and prosperity—something electorates had by then come to demand.

I would argue that Keynes's approach itself marked a more nationalistic approach to economic policy than pre-Depression orthodoxy. But by the 1930s, it was obvious that the underlying political landscape had changed from that which had supported the pre-WWI internationalism so vividly described in Keynes's *Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1919)—the benefits of which were enjoyed most fully by the propertied class. The Great War itself had changed the game in two ways: first, workers demanded a greater political voice and a bigger slice of the economic pie after war-time sacrifices (the same happened after World War II). Second, the extensive control governments exercised during

the war illustrated how far State action could go in affecting economic outcomes. With an eye to Russia and Germany, Keynes recognized that the continuing legitimacy of democratic government hinged on a forceful State response to depression, the response being primarily targeted toward national objectives in order to discourage national upheaval.

Three years before *The General Theory*, Keynes gave a lecture in Dublin, in what was then the Irish Free State. The lecture foreshadowed Keynes's call for radical government action to combat the Depression and set out his thinking about the changes in international economic relations then taking place. Coincidentally but appropriately, Keynes spoke on April 19, 1933, the day before the United States under President Franklin Roosevelt abandoned the gold standard—itself a major blow against an institution that had long “symbolized internationalism and the rule of international law” (Mundell, 1968, p. 288). I would like to dwell on this speech because, while many have quoted some of its abundant memorable lines without adequate context, the speech as a whole can be read as a pragmatic response to the crisis of the times, with important lessons, I believe, for today's crisis.

It was no accident that Keynes's lecture on “National Self-Sufficiency” took place in Dublin. Not for the first or last time, events in Ireland carried a significance more universal, persistent, and consequential than one would guess from the country's small physical size. In a very interesting book, Nolan (2013) explores in detail the background of the invitation to Keynes, and his reasons for accepting it. (See also Skidelsky, 1994, pp. 476–490.)

The story begins with the 1932 accession to power in the Irish Free State of the nationalist Fianna Fáil party led by Éamon de Valera, who soon renounced Irish land annuity payments owed to Britain under the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty. There followed a cycle of mutual trade policy aggression that would last until 1938 (O'Rourke, 1991). For some in de Valera's circle, however, the trade war was not unwelcome: they hoped protection would spur diversification of Ireland's economy away from its then comparative advantage in dairy and agriculture, and toward greater self-sufficiency, including in manufacturing. Irish opposition figures skeptical of this program invited Keynes to give the first annual Finlay Lecture at University College, Dublin, believing he could warn credibly against the dangers of excesses.

He did—not by an appeal to a pre-Depression economic orthodoxy that he admitted had failed miserably—but with a plea for more gradual experimentation, rather than radical transformation toward a predestined endpoint determined by ideology rather than the practical goal of bettering people's lives. The shorter versions of the speech reprinted in the *Yale Review* and the *New Statesman* are most commonly cited, but as Nolan (2013) argues, the more complete version published soon after in the Irish journal *Studies* better captures Keynes's purpose and meaning.

His message was that, in an unprecedented global crisis, no one had privileged knowledge of best practice—different nations might opt for different modes of experimentation, which might run more easily if some of the external turbulence of the times were temporarily shut out. National goals might also be easier to attain if some aspects of international integration were limited to give governments a freer hand—a point Dani Rodrik has made repeatedly since the 1990s. The Dublin lecture, consistently with *The General Theory*, does foreshadow an expanded role for the State, including in economic “planning”—the modern mixed economy. But Keynes also raised an alarm against the practice of destructive radicalism for its own sake.

Some relevant points emerge from the lecture. First, a critique of pre-Depression capitalism:

- “[T]he age of economic internationalism was not particularly successful in avoiding war”
- “The decadent international but individualistic capitalism, in the hands of which we found ourselves after the war, was not a success.”
- “There may be some financial calculation which shows it to be advantageous that my savings should be invested in whatever quarter of the habitable globe shows the greatest marginal efficiency of capital or the highest rate of interest. But experience is accumulating that remoteness between ownership and operation—which is historically symbolized for you in Ireland by absentee landlordism—is an evil in the relations between men”
- “[W]e have until recently conceived it a moral duty to ruin the tillers of the soil and destroy the age-old human traditions attendant on husbandry, if we could get a loaf of bread thereby a tenth of a penny cheaper.”

Next, recognition of the case for experimentation, possibly better practiced under some restrictions on international transactions:

- “Each year it becomes more obvious that the world is embarking on a variety of politico-economic experiments, and that different types of experiment appeal to different national temperaments and historical environments.”
- “Advisable domestic policies might often be easier to compass, if the phenomenon known as ‘the flight of capital’ could be ruled out.”

Finally, caution about radicalism for its own sake:

- “[T]he policy of national self-sufficiency is to be considered, not as an ideal in itself, but as directed to the creation of an environment in which other ideals can be safely and conveniently pursued.”
- “The economic transition of a Society is a thing to be accomplished slowly. What I have been discussing is not a sudden revolution, but the direction of a secular trend.”
- “What a wound would have been inflicted on the fair face of Ireland if within two or three years her rich pastures were to be ploughed up and the result were to be a fiasco!”
- “No one has the right to gamble with the resources of a people by going blindly into technical changes imperfectly understood. Russia stands before us as an awful example”

While not putting it nearly in the same category as Stalinism, Keynes might, I suspect, say the same about Brexit.

As I have suggested, the Depression and war led to an upsurge in nationalism of a particular kind—not always intrinsically hostile to foreigners, but intent on purely domestic economic goals. In the decade remaining to him after *The General Theory*, Keynes indeed embraced the goal of reconciling his great book’s program for radical national action with the economic gains offered by vibrant international trade. As he foresaw in *The General Theory* (p. 382), “[I]f nations can learn to provide themselves with full employment by their domestic policy ... there need be no important forces calculated to set the interest of one country against that of its neighbours. There would still be room for the international division of labour and for international lending in appropriate conditons.” A key element of Keynes’s program was to channel countries’ nationalistic pursuit of prosperity away from the collisions that beggar-thy-neighbor policies could cause, and thereby to promote *global* prosperity, including in the developing world.

Eichengreen (1984)—who gave the last Finlay Lecture in 1996 before its endowment ran out of money—argues that Keynes came to believe that international cooperation on balance of payments (as eventually codified in the IMF) might go far to reconcile national full-employment policies with reasonably open trade. Eichengreen quotes Keynes defending the Bretton Woods treaty before the House of Lords in 1945:

Separate economic blocs, and all the friction and loss of friendship they bring with them, are expedients to which one may be driven in a hostile world where trade has ceased, over wide areas, to be cooperative and peaceful and where are forgotten the healthy rules of mutual advantage and equal treatment. But it is surely crazy to prefer that.

The IMF’s main tools to promote trade were balance of payments support, pegged but adjustable exchange rates, prescriptions against currency manipulation, and obligations to restore current-account convertibility—but not free capital movements. Proposed rules for international trade—as eventually embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) frameworks—were not included in the Bretton Woods architecture that Keynes helped negotiate, but in the later Havana Charter of March 1948.

The goal of Bretton Woods was to “embed” a liberal trading order within a framework that would allow governments the policy autonomy to respond to domestic downturns (Ikenberry, 1992; Obstfeld & Taylor, 2017). Thereby, these safety valves could protect the system from political reactions that might bring a return to conditions of the mid-1930s. As Ikenberry (1992, p. 319) notes, the advent of Keynesian ideas solved a key dilemma of the time by balancing the advantages of the market against the need for governmental domestic policy space:

The Bretton Woods agreement articulated a middle position between a nineteenth-century style free trade system and regional or national capitalist arrangements. The policy views of the monetary experts [from the U.S. and U.K. Treasuries] were intellectually synthetic and politically robust: they not only provided a respectable position between extremes and set the stage for political compromise between the British and American governments, but they also foreshadowed and perhaps enabled a broader sociopolitical reordering of coalitions within postwar Western capitalist democracies.

However, dynamic forces—partly the result of the system’s very achievements—pushed this balance increasingly to favor the market over time.

4 | POSTWAR US LEADERSHIP, EVOLVING MARKET PRESSURES, AND EUROPE'S PATH

Once the United States was shocked out of incipient isolationism by Soviet aggression—a development that led to the Marshall Plan and other policy innovations—the postwar architecture was quite successful in restoring global growth and trade. In particular, Europe returned to currency convertibility in 1959, having created a Common Market in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. A conscious part of US policy had also been to encourage the breakup of colonial empires while supporting economic growth in the newly independent developing countries, which would allow them better to resist Communist ideology and provide markets for US exports.

Over time, however, stresses in the Bretton Woods monetary system emerged as greater de facto capital mobility enabled currency crises, the US balance of payments weakened, and US trade partners chafed under the asymmetric power of US monetary policy. A key geopolitical factor was US allies' uneasiness with the escalation of the war in Vietnam. Moreover, while progress within the GATT continued, domestic trade tensions emerged in the United States. Organized labor, which still supported the Kennedy Round of tariff reductions in 1962, moved to an anti-trade posture over the subsequent decade, in particular as unions recognized that firms' ability to move abroad and sell into the United States diminished labor's bargaining power (Alden, 2017).

As inflationary pressures grew and growth slowed in the lead-up to the 1972 US election, the Nixon Administration unilaterally moved to shore up the domestic economy at the expense of domestic institutions, markets, and trade partners. The approach ultimately hastened the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. Nixon's nationalistic package featured:

- Severing the link between gold and dollars held by foreign monetary authorities.
- A 10% import surcharge of questionable legality, to be kept in place until trade partners agreed to revalue their currencies against the dollar.
- Domestic wage and price controls.
- Pressure on Federal Reserve chair Arthur Burns to loosen monetary policy despite inflationary pressures—an action that would also stoke unwelcome inflationary pressures abroad, given that other countries were pegging to the US dollar (Mallaby, 2016, pp. 140–144).

As Treasury Secretary John Connally memorably stated at a meeting of the Group of 10 around that time, “It's our currency, but it's your problem.”

We should also admit that the adoption of floating exchange rates in early 1973 (at least among the advanced economies) was in truth a move in the direction of more nationalistic monetary policies—that is why economists advocating flexible rates in the 1950s and 1960s, such as Friedman, Meade, and Johnson, made reference to monetary autonomy or sovereignty. But it would be simplistic to view these economists as consciously promoting nationalism in economic policy. On the contrary, they believed that fixed exchange rates forced countries to restrict trade in order to maintain currency commitments, and that conversely, flexible rates would encourage greater globalization of trade and payments. As Johnson (1969) put it:

The main argument for flexible exchange rates at the present time is that they would make [the] surrender of [monetary] sovereignty unnecessary, while at the same time making unnecessary the progressive extension of interventions in international trade and payments that failure to resolve this issue necessarily entails.

Johnson and his school assumed that payment restrictions on the capital account were either infeasible or an excessive price to regain monetary sovereignty with a fixed exchange rate. I suspect Keynes would not have agreed with this resolution of the monetary trilemma—nor would a growing school of economists today. Johnson also underplayed the importance of the exchange rate as a potential additional target of monetary policy, as opposed to a residual outcome.

Why do many economists resist the idea that monetary independence with a flexible exchange rate is an inherently nationalistic innovation, in the sense that it permits the alignment of national policies with national goals? One reason is that pursuing the domestic goals of full employment and price stability can be seen as a Pareto-improving endeavor in principle, both with respect to the domestic electorate and foreign partners—it may simply be about putting

underutilized resources to good use. In contrast, tariffs, for example, will clearly redistribute income domestically and immiserize foreigners.

But despite a body of literature suggesting that the gains from international monetary coordination are small, and the protestations of advanced-economy central bankers that their monetary policies spill over positively to trade partners (e.g., Bernanke, 2017; Fischer, 2016), monetary policies clearly can have unwelcome foreign repercussions, often small but sometimes significant, as well as domestic redistributive effects. This is the gravamen of Rajan's (2016) critique of advanced-economy unconventional monetary policies.

Starting in 1973, Europe, of course, went a different route—with exchange flexibility against the dollar, but an increasing degree of internal exchange stability, viewed as necessary to support a single market, and which culminated in 1999 in the euro. This evolution inevitably coupled with a complete surrender of state-level monetary sovereignty (except to the extent of national voting power on the ECB Governing Council) and less inevitably with a surrender in fiscal autonomy that remains controversial. In many areas, regulatory sovereignty resides with the European Commission, whereas the division of financial stability policy between system-wide and national competencies remains a work in progress.

The single market, coupled with labor mobility, has required at least some degree of convergence in approaches to worker protections and benefits, even though the European welfare states remain diverse and indeed grew out of different traditions, with the United Kingdom now at the liberal extreme (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1990). The tension between national sovereignty and system-wide efficiency (e.g., though expanded fiscal union) is central to the current debate over Europe's future.

5 | FROM MARKET ASCENDANCY TO RENEWED CRISIS

In the 1990s, major center-left political parties, notably in the United States and United Kingdom, embraced more of a laissez-faire attitude toward regulation and the market; moreover, market-based approaches also were followed by emerging market economies, with especially impressive aggregate growth results in two of the largest, China and India. Export orientation was a major component of emerging-market success, though in many cases, particularly in East Asia, some form of subsidization, including through exchange-rate policy, clearly helped. Financial crises emerged with increasing frequency and scope throughout the world.

One key development behind the shift toward the market was the 1989–1991 demise of the Soviet bloc, which largely discredited its centralized economic model. But apart from the impact on economic policy practice, the geopolitical implications were massive. The United States had finally won the struggle with the USSR that began in the latter 1940s. The way was open for NATO expansion and for the expansion of the European Union eastward.

An important indicator of success for the related postwar project of elevating the poorer countries was a notable decline in *inter-country* inequality in the world economy, as indicated in Figure 6. This has been more than simply a China-India story, although there remains a sizable fraction of poor countries failing to converge to developed-economy per capita income levels (International Monetary Fund, 2017, Box 1.3). At the same time, however, Figure 6 also shows that *intra-country* inequality rose over this period. This rise in inequality was pronounced in some richer countries, notably the United States, whereas it was somewhat more muted in Europe (at least with respect to after-tax incomes) due to welfare-state structures.

And we now know that in the United States especially, the 2000s saw considerable industrial restructuring due to trade and technology trends, entailing disruption of local communities. Autor et al. (2016) have famously documented US effects of Chinese import penetration. Even before then, labor-market polarization had been building as the skill premium widened. However, overall advanced-economy growth was generally healthy in the 1990s and 2000s up to 2008, muting the resulting political pressures. Growth in the 2000s depended on unsustainable financial froth, however, and when it collapsed in the 2008 crisis, a number of political tensions ultimately came home to roost.

Arguably, we are at a new crisis stage—most notably in the advanced economies, but also elsewhere—as evidenced by the rise of populism and nationalism, as well as nationalistic trade policies. Its causes are familiar: stagnant median wage growth coupled with growing inequalities, including between workers at different skill or education levels and between thriving urban regions and smaller towns; de-industrialization and an attendant loss of higher-paying middle-skill jobs; in many cases, corruption; and sharper cultural divides, sometimes linked to immigration, but not really separable from disorienting economic shifts and dislocation. (Wolf, 2019 describes causes and symptoms and draws parallels with earlier crisis periods. Also see Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020.) Among voters embracing nationalist politicians, a




FIGURE 6 Global inequality measures. *Source*: Methodology of Bourguignon (2015), as kindly updated by the author

sense of national decline and expropriation often prevails, with “the nation” typically defined in fairly narrow terms that may evoke nostalgia for a mythical past.

In the context of a European Union undergoing enlargement and deeper integration in the mid-1990s, the late historian Tony Judt (Judt, 1996) accurately captured the danger of some citizens feeling left behind in an increasingly globalized world:

If “Europe” stands for the winners, who shall speak for the losers—the “south,” the poor, the linguistically, educationally, or culturally disadvantaged, underprivileged, or despised Europeans who don’t live in golden triangles along vanished frontiers? The risk is that what remains to these Europeans is “the nation,” or, more precisely, nationalism; not the national separatism of Catalans or the regional self-advancement of Lombards but the preservation of the nineteenth-century state as a bulwark against change.... [W]e should recognize the reality of nations and states, and note the risk that, when neglected, they become an electoral resource of nationalists.

Globalization does not bear the sole blame for this sense of loss. To the extent that technology and trade are separable at a global level, the former has been immensely important. But whether we like it or not as economists, the new crisis is causing political changes that may lead, and are already leading in some countries, to a questioning of economic orthodoxy analogous to the 1930s when Keynes spoke in Dublin.

One hopes that today’s process will be less dramatic and destructive, but national policies will likely shift, accompanied by some alterations to the global economic architecture established over the postwar decades. Just as in the 1930s, it is hard to discern which approaches will be more successful in terms of combining favorable economic and political outcomes, or if those successful modes of adjustment will come to prevail globally. The addition of COVID-19 to the mix early in 2020 has made the future even harder to predict, but a useful starting point is the underlying politico-economic landscape.

6 | POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBALIZATION

First, how has the political landscape and the role of economic factors changed?

Political polarization is hollowing out the political middle. In recent years, we saw attacks on established international trading relationships by the president of the United States and elements of the UK political class who only a few

years ago looked to be on the fringe. As Tolstoy might say, “every country is unhappy in its own way,” and the underlying drivers of a rejection of more global-minded “elites” range from de-industrialization to immigration to corruption. But economists and political scientists (sometimes using individual-level data) have begun to uncover some illuminating empirical evidence linking recent economic to political developments, notably in advanced economies.

At a very general level, Funke et al. (2019) look at data from 20 advanced economies since the late nineteenth century and find that financial crises tend to be followed by political polarization, marked by a heightened influence of right-wing sentiment demonizing minorities and foreigners. De Bromhead et al. (2013) take a closer look at the economic roots of right-wing extremism in the interwar period and find that a failure of governments to tackle depressed conditions—which, as we have seen, Keynes worried about—was a big factor.

Consequences of the 2008-2009 crisis in many advanced economies included higher government deficit and debt levels, which in turn led some governments to embark on fiscal austerity. Fetzer (2019) finds that British voters' support for the UKIP party (as well as other measures of political unhappiness) resulted from exposure to austerity in 2010. Furthermore, Fetzer documents a degradation in the UK welfare state's ability to redistribute income from 2010 on, when David Cameron became Prime Minister and George Osborne became Chancellor. Becker and Fetzer (2017) demonstrate a link between inward migration to the United Kingdom from EU accession countries and anti-EU sentiment, as well as a congestion effect on government services and housing.

Regional economic decline has reinforced voters' migration toward populist-nationalist parties. Becker et al. (2017) find votes for Brexit in June 2016, as well as for Marine Le Pen in the French presidential election the year after, were driven by past deindustrialization, high unemployment, lower incomes, and lower education levels. Broz et al. (2021) document the geographic link between populist support and relative economic decline in the United States and Europe, and argue that uneven impacts and recoveries from the 2008-2009 financial crisis deepened the divide between metropolitan and more sparsely populated areas, heightening voter resentment in the latter.

Looking more specifically at import-driven deindustrialization, Colantone and Stanig (2018a) show that a “China shock” instrument helps explain UK support for Brexit, whereas Colantone and Stanig (2018b) find that in 15 European countries over 1988–2007, Chinese import penetration moved voters toward right-wing nationalist parties. Autor et al. (2017), who study a number of US Congressional and Presidential elections between 2002 and 2016, find that their Chinese import penetration instrument predicts greater political polarization toward anti-trade and nativist politicians. Margalit (2011) finds particular US voter sensitivity to trade-related job loss, especially from offshoring.

Even if import penetration has had impacts on political polarization in Europe as well as the United States, it seems clear that the backlash against international trade per se has been much more of a factor in the United States. There, former President Trump implemented a program of tariff aggression toward trade partners—with the aim of making bilateral “deals” to enhance US net exports—and a general retreat from multilateral cooperation, on issues ranging from exchange rates to trade to climate to public health. His avowed aims were to enhance US growth and return US manufacturing closer to its earlier postwar glory.

The US retreat from its traditional championship of a non-discriminatory and rule-based trading order was especially significant, in view of the key global convening and coordination role that the United States had played up until the Trump administration, and which it seemed prepared to abandon. How quickly and well the new Biden administration will be able to repair the damage is an open question. But as Europe reacts to US actions, to its own internal dynamics, and to other external events such as China's drive to expand its global influence, it, too, will play a big role in the future of globalization.

These reflections lead to a second question, upon which the future of globalization depends. Given a changed political landscape, where are these two key players, the United States and Europe, headed?

Figure 7 (from Catão & Obstfeld, 2019) offers (an admittedly simplistic) schematic for organizing thinking about the politics of trade policy. One can think of at least four different political equilibriums that could emerge from democratic processes, with only two of them favorable to globalization, and the second of those possibly politically unstable (as some would argue the recent US experience shows):

Upper left. Voters embrace egalitarian policies (high progressive taxation financing an extensive social safety net), which can then facilitate trade and financial openness, and even some immigration (e.g., classic European social democracy).

Upper right. Voters do *not* want policies to address inequality directly (through higher progressive taxes and extensive social transfers), but economic openness is still the chosen policy regime—for example, Reaganism or Thatcherism.

Lower right. Voters do not demand government policies to address inequality directly, and government successfully deflects blame toward other countries, rolling back globalization and trying to extract rents from foreigners through

	LEFT	RIGHT
FREER TRADE	Moderate Social Democracies	Laissez-Faire Conservatism
TRADE INTERVENTIONISM	Left-Wing Populism	Right-Wing Populism

FIGURE 7 Political orientations and trade. *Source* : See Catão and Obstfeld (2019)

higher import tariffs, the discouragement of offshoring, and tighter immigration rules, both to raise domestic employment as well as wages and possibly to appease xenophobic sentiment (the pattern under right-wing populism). Trade restrictions and perhaps cultural warfare rather than explicit redistributive policies of the State are the tool of choice to support the political base.

Lower left. Voters do want policies that directly address inequality, and the government chooses to redirect resources both through more progressive taxation and taxes on foreign trade as well as business (the case of left-wing populism).

In their classic study, O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) hypothesized that trade globalization, through its very success in reallocating resources more efficiently, could set up political pressures that eventually undermine open trade. Likewise, the recent US experience suggests that the Upper Right entry may be unstable, especially as the pressures from structural change in the global economy reinforce pressures from technological change to disadvantage key segments of the population, with inadequate social safety nets to soften the blow. Consistent with this view, as noted above, the attenuation of UK social safety nets due to austerity, and under perceived pressure from EU immigration, may also have promoted voting for Leave in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, trade backlash has been much more muted (so far) in continental Europe, where social safety nets have remained more robust, as represented by the Upper Left combination.

Rodrik (1998), among others, has observed and documented the tendency for more open economies to have larger governments. Another illustration, covering advanced economies, is in Figure 8. According to Rodrik's logic, economies that are more open are subject to bigger external shocks, and therefore require more extensive government resources for social protection. At the same time, a more extensive welfare state may bolster support for global integration. Thus, it is plausible that the size and efficiency of the welfare state are intimately linked to support for trade. And this insight is key to answer our question about the future role the United States and Europe will play in the global economy.

In pursuit of that answer, it is helpful to ask two sub-questions: first, does the US open-trade regime that prevailed until recently devolve into a Lower Left or Lower Right skepticism over trade in Figure 7—and does it matter? And second, are there shocks that could destabilize the Upper Left combination in a way that markedly reduces support for trade? The answers may hinge on the evolution of government social support policies.

First, on the United States. It is hard to overstate the change in trade attitudes that has occurred in the Congressional Republican party (if not in the sizable component of its grass-roots base that Trump has mobilized). When Democrats lost control of the Senate in November 2014, President Obama saw an opportunity to work with Republicans in Congress on passing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). As a member of the Council of Economic Advisers, I witnessed the close coordination between the White House and the Republican chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Paul Ryan, to pass the (fast-track) Trade Promotion Authority (or TPA) critical for TPP's eventual passage. On the whole, Congressional Democrats were strongly opposed to their own president's initiative.

In the June 2015 votes on TPA (the same month Trump announced his candidacy), only 13 Democratic senators (all from coastal or farm states) and 28 Democratic representatives supported trade. (Even Democratic Rep. Adam Smith of




FIGURE 8 Expenditure on active and passive labor market policies in 2013 and import penetration (percent of GDP). *Source* : See Catão and Obstfeld (2019)

Washington state voted against trade—so sad!) A large majority of Republicans, however, did vote for TPA. In sharp contrast, no Republican objected openly when Donald Trump, then President, withdrew from TPP within a few days of taking office only a year and a half later.

With both major US political parties now basically in the trade-skeptic camp, the prospects for robust US support of the global trading system seem bleak. And in any case, the new Biden administration is likely to focus its energies domestically given the multiple crises it faces. On the Republican side, some are attempting to spell out a new ideological framework to underpin a political philosophy combining skepticism of a big central government with industrial protection and immigration restriction. In a notable speech, Republican Sen. Josh Hawley of Missouri (Hawley, 2019), elected in November 2018, attacked a “cosmopolitan elite” that allegedly favors globalization over “things like place and national feeling and religious faith,” as well as consumption over (the presumably more virtuous activity of) production. Clearly, part of the program requires restrictions on immigration, trade, and capital flows—the last of which have so far, perhaps due to the finance industry’s political influence, escaped relatively unscathed from the US turn against globalization. The speech does not mention the bill Hawley and Sen. Tammy Baldwin, a Wisconsin Democrat, introduced, which would tax US capital inflows so as to limit the trade deficit to no more than 1/2 percent of GDP—a policy that, in my view, would accomplish none of Hawley’s goals, but instead cause a sharp recession.¹ However, one must assume that the bill is consistent with Hawley’s program. The speech also refers to investments in workers and in “heartland” communities. However, it is short on details, does not spell out how new programs would be consistent with a presumed small-government philosophy, and diverges conspicuously from policies the Trump administration actually pursued. Hawley places a strong emphasis on support for family and religion, with religious communities “protecting the vulnerable, defending the weak.” This does not sound like a recipe for expanding the US welfare state.

That is not the approach of the US left, which clearly shares some of Hawley’s concerns about middle-class decline but sees a definite role for expanded government action. Sen. Elizabeth Warren’s campaign plan (Warren, 2019) for “economic patriotism” hit many of the same notes as Hawley’s speech, but with much greater policy specificity. There are certainly parts of her program that would be problematic from the point of view of US relations with trade partners—subsidizing exports and seeking a weak dollar. But the program itself is not intrinsically protectionist, anti-immigration, or anti-globalist, and the expanded social safety net Sen. Warren has proposed, if constructed, could ultimately raise US voters’ support for trade. Republicans at the Niskanen Center, who have largely broken away from

President Trump, have explicitly advocated enhanced domestic risk sharing sponsored by government as a way to promote trade (Lindsey et al., 2018).

7 | ADDRESSING OUR CRISIS: OBSTACLES AND PROMISE

For addressing the current crisis, advice that Padoa-Schioppa (2010) applied to the Global Financial Crisis a decade ago certainly fits:

The exit from the configuration that led to [the crisis] should be a government which, of course, respects economic freedom, but at the same time exerts its role forcefully and is not prostrate before the twin idols of the market and the nation-state.

However, voters have to choose such a government, an outcome endogenous to the political system and dependent on a range of initial conditions. And this likelihood faces obstacles.

Important research by Alesina and Glaeser (2004) suggests that a key barrier to a more extensive welfare state in the United States is racial heterogeneity. Attitudes toward race and ethnicity were key to the 2020 US elections, and even with President Biden's victory and a narrow Democratic majority in the US Congress, it remains unclear if the country will swing significantly in a direction friendlier to institutional innovations that might eventually generate more support for international trade.

And what about Europe? Not all is well there, either. In light of the recent tensions over immigration, we cannot discount the possibility that those same tensions eat away at the European welfare state, with consequences for attitudes toward trade. As Alesina and Glaeser wrote 15 years ago:

One natural implication of our conclusion that fractionalization reduces redistribution is that if Europe becomes more heterogeneous due to immigration, ethnic divisions will be used to challenge the generous welfare state.

Basing his assessment on more recent data, Lindert (2019) surveys the interplay between immigration policy and the welfare state and concludes that in Germany and Sweden, opposition to immigration could translate into a dilution of social entitlements.

Supporting this concern, Alesina et al. (2019) survey natives in the United States, United Kingdom, and four continental European countries. They find that respondents generally overestimate the number of immigrants in their countries, underestimate their education and skills, and become more negative about redistribution after hearing questions about immigrants. Thus, claims that nationalist sentiment in Europe stems largely from immigration rather than trade ignores the potential for immigration strains to spill over onto trade attitudes down the road.

Of course, demographic trends also may endanger the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state.

Even in a benign scenario where countries experiment in the hope of reducing domestic inequities while maintaining economic openness—at least with respect to cross-border transactions—there remains Keynes's question of the degree to which openness itself can frustrate policy goals. Rodrik (2000) suggested a trilemma whereby at most two of the following three can be simultaneously compatible: “international economic integration, the nation-state, and mass politics.” For example, an extensive welfare state can insure citizens against the bigger economic shocks that exposure to world markets brings, while redistributing resources domestically to compensate the losers from trade. But if capital is entirely footloose and can flee abroad to avoid taxation, countries may well enter a competitive race to the bottom in capital taxation, leaving labor to bear the entire burden of the welfare state. This disproportionate burden, in turn, could be politically destabilizing.

One solution, which would have drawn Keynes's sympathy, is control over cross-border capital flows. This approach entails compromising economic openness. But another avenue is multilateral cooperation over capital taxation. This route entails a partial delegation of fiscal sovereignty. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries have embarked on some degree of coordination to discourage profit shifting by multinational enterprises, but much more needs doing, including on digitalization, agreed minimum corporate taxes, and concerted action against off-shore havens and money laundering.

Such initiatives, explained well to the public, could themselves bolster support for multilateral economic governance reform in other essential areas, notably security, trade, anti-corruption, labor standards, climate, and aid (Thier & Alexander, 2019). All of these efforts could help stem the flows of migrants out of poorer countries in response to natural and manufactured disasters—currently a central political stressor. In addition, while multilateralism does entail a delegation of sovereignty, it can furnish a commitment technology that avoids lose-lose equilibria. Furthermore, for smaller countries, multilateralism can actually enhance sovereignty, by acting as a bulwark against bullying by larger countries—a real danger, as we saw in the Trump era (Zedillo, 2019). Making this program work will also require investment in education and a free media—to open minds. All in all, this is a program Keynes certainly would have supported as well.

An integrated world economy, in which international trade and capital movements facilitated disruptions to the balance of power as well as imperialist rivalries, incubated World War I (Tooze & Fertik, 2014; Wolf, 2019). World War II grew instead out of a world of economic nationalism. By the time of the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, had Keynes's opinion of 1933—that deep economic interdependence not only might fail to promote peace, but conceivably could undermine it—changed? I suspect he would have argued pragmatically that the benefits of economic integration can be considerable, including for geopolitics, but in light of political realities, they extend only up to a point. The evolution of the current China-US trade conflict seems consistent with this view.

The challenge for countries today is to find a comfortable and safe middle ground on the tradeoff between economic sovereignty and integration. Multilateral cooperation can make the tradeoff more favorable toward integration, with countries perhaps delegating some sovereignty, but in the interest of achieving better outcomes from voters' perspectives than countries could reach on their own.

The COVID-19 pandemic has, however, sparked a further breakdown in global cooperation. One key failure has been on international public health—an area Cooper (1989) saw three decades ago as a success story and a possible model for further cooperative endeavors. According to Global Trade Alert (update of June 19, 2020), 90 jurisdictions imposed a total of 177 export controls on medical supplies and medicines after the start of the pandemic. Uncoordinated competition for supplies of medical equipment and drugs heightened both inefficiencies and geopolitical tensions. Many, but by no means all, of the export controls have been rolled back. The distribution of vaccines, however, is also being driven by nationalistic imperatives, further fueling antagonism among countries.

Add to this the inherently centrifugal force of the pathogen's economic impact—not only protective measures, but borders closed to travel and a desire to retract supply chains within national boundaries—and the prospects that future cooperation can support globalization, or address other urgent global collective action problems such as climate change and cybersecurity, look dim. However, as the pandemic itself illustrates, the costs of coordination failure in these areas are high and ever rising. Is it too late to change course? To do so, we would need a rededication to international cooperation on the order of that which followed World War II. Economic cooperation, increasingly strained in recent years, is a central priority in any such plans.

Eighty-six years after Keynes lectured in Dublin, Ireland is a test case for the proposition that economic integration can foster peace. Probably the most striking supportive example in today's world has been the Good Friday agreement of 1998, a settlement built upon Irish and UK membership in the EU single market (O'Rourke, 2019). As UK exit from the EU single market loomed, with its threat of an economic border through the Irish island or through the Irish sea, violence reappeared. And the future of the Irish border remains uncertain. Economic interdependence clearly is not sufficient to ensure a peaceful world, but it may be necessary.

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ENDNOTE

¹ <https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FINAL%20ONE-PAGER%20The%20Competitive%20Dollar%20for%20Jobs%20and%20Prosperity%20Act.pdf>

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